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AN EXAMINATION OF THE FACTORS
INFLUENCING THE ENACTMENT OF BANKING
LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE
FROM FIFTY YEARS OF BANKING LAWS AND
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REGULATION
WILLIAM C. HANDORF, REGGIE O’SHIELDS, AND ANDREW RICHARDSON *
The enactment of new banking laws in the United States is
cyclical. When the unemployment rate balloons and the economy
contracts, more banks fail. In response to surging bank failures, loss of
confidence in the banking system, and escalating public costs for the
federal government to bailout the system, Congress conducts hearings
and passes more restrictive laws. Such legislation attempts to reduce the
likelihood of future bank failures, and often creates new regulatory
organizations to carry out the mandate. With the passage of time,
regulatory agencies provide bankers guidance in the form of regulation.
Safety and soundness regulatory guidance varies with the economy, the
number of bank failures, and the party affiliation of the President and
Congress. Administrative guidance varies little with economic, industry,
or political factors. Regulatory compliance rules increase with the
passage of a new banking law and with inflation given that many
historical laws (e.g., civil money penalties) require that monetary
thresholds adjust according to revised price levels. There is no
discernable trend or evidence suggesting that either banking laws or their
accompanying regulations have been issued more frequently over the
period assessed.

* William C. Handorf, Ph.D., is a professor of finance and banking with the George
Washington University’s School of Business located in Washington, D.C. In addition to
academic duties, he serves as a director with the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta. Reggie
O’Shields, Esq., is Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal Home Loan
Bank of Atlanta. Andrew Richardson is a student at the University of Georgia School of Law
and contributed to this research while serving as a legal intern at the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Atlanta. All opinions expressed in this article are solely those of its authors, and do not
express the opinions of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta, any of its other officers or
directors, or the Federal Home Loan Bank System.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Given the importance of access to credit by consumers and
businesses and recognition of the substantial public costs that can be and
are incurred when insured institutions periodically fail in predictable and
preventable situations, banks are a special sector in commerce.
Consequently, banks are subject to extensive supervision and regulation
resulting from legislation enacted by Congress. The justification for
wide-ranging regulatory supervision reflects several different rationales,
including: (1) issuance of charters by federal or state government; (2)
access to the central bank’s discount window; (3) deposit insurance
coverage; (4) control of systemic risk; and (5) commitment to social and
community needs. The latter four rationales reflect legislation enacted
over the past century. 1
This Article reviews key banking laws enacted in the United
States during the past half-century and focuses on resulting regulatory
trends over the previous twenty-five years. We address a number of
related questions. How has banking legislation, supervision, and
regulation evolved and what external factors, if any, precipitate change?
Does legislation and resulting regulation primarily respond to periods of
increasing bank failure or do other economic, political, and social
problems provide a policy catalyst? Do evolving regulations primarily
reflect safety and soundness, compliance, or administrative matters? Are
regulatory pronouncements increasing, decreasing, or exhibiting little in
the way of a trend over the decades studied?
This Article examines the antecedents of the passage of banking
law and subsequent promulgation of accompanying regulation. Part II
provides general background material on the regulation of the banking
industry. 2 Part III examines historical bank failures and subsequent
legislative responses, highlighting the cyclical nature of financial
regulation and the economy. 3 Part IV examines the correlation between
bank failures and economic distress. 4 Part V discusses recent bank

1. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 81-797, 64 Stat 873 (1950);
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977); DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. See infra Part II
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part IV.
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legislation. 5 Part VI reviews recent bank regulation. 6 We conclude in
Part VII by highlighting the issues that impact the passage of banking law
and the promulgation of accompanying regulation. 7
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION
We have categorized banking law and regulation into three
general categories: safety and soundness, compliance, and
administrative. Safety and soundness regulation is designed to protect
against systemic risk and ensure banks retain sufficient capital and
liquidity to remain viable and able to meet the financial needs of
communities and the nation. 8 Regulation focuses not only on capital and
liquidity, but also on asset quality, earnings, sensitivity, management,
risk management, and incentive compensation among many other related
areas. Compliance regulation is enacted to ensure banks meet the
legitimate financial needs of the respective regions they serve and
requires institutions to provide full disclosure to, and the fair and nondiscriminatory treatment of, all customers. 9 Administrative regulation
includes rules of practice and procedure, bank governance provisions,
assessment and deposit insurance requirements, and freedom of
information issues, among other rules. Regulation must balance the
threat of monopoly or oligopoly within a market, as banks are allowed to
expand in size by merger and acquisition, and add new related services
that may promote economies of scale and scope.
Financial regulators exercise their supervisory authority on a
number of levels. At the top of that hierarchy are federal statutes, which
provide the legislative authority for the relevant regulatory agency to act,
consistent with the constitutional concept of separation of powers since
regulatory agencies are placed within the executive branch of
government. Ultimately, all regulatory action, including rulemaking and
other regulatory processes, must be traced back to federal legislation and
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
Examples of safety and soundness regulations include enhanced liquidity, capital and
other prudential regulations issued under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
9. Examples of compliance regulations include standards issued under the Community
Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977).
5.
6.
7.
8.
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must be consistent with that legislation. To the extent the legislation has
delegated rulemaking authority to a regulatory agency, as frequently
occurs as the statute becomes more complex, courts typically give
deference to such agency action unless Congress has been clear in the
statute as to its intent. 10 Under the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 11 rulemakings or regulations, which have general applicability
and the force of law, must typically be issued through a defined process
that involves public notice and comment. 12 In 2018, federal banking
regulators reiterated the long-standing legal principles that supervisory
guidance does not have the force and effect of law and that regulators do
not take enforcement actions based on supervisory guidance. Rather,
guidance articulates supervisory expectations and priorities. 13
Existing research has not evaluated how banking law and
subsequent regulatory releases have evolved in relation to the health of
the industry, the political environment, and the economy. Are there
regulatory patterns that can be categorized, classified, differentiated or
arranged in any meaningful hierarchical series?
As initially
hypothesized, bank failures feature prominently in the enactment of
banking laws and the subsequent promulgation of regulations.
Many financial, organizational, economic, and legal studies
assess the favorable and unfavorable impact of regulation and law once
enacted. For example, when rules required banks to increase equity
capital, studies demonstrated that return on assets increases, the leverage
multiplier declined, and the return on equity tended to decline below the
rate required by investors. 14 Similarly, when large and internationallyactive banking organizations were subject to compliance with the
restrictive Liquidity Coverage Ratio (“LCR”) and the Net Stable Funding
Ratio (“NSFR”), research disclosed the adverse financial consequence.15
The LCR was designed to ensure a bank retains sufficient liquid assets to
See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
Id.
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 18-5/ CA 18-7, INTERAGENCY
STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Sept. 12, 2018).
14. William C. Handorf, Capital Management and Bank Value, 12 J. BANKING REG.,
Sept. 2011, at 1–11.
15. William C. Handorf, The Cost of Bank Liquidity, 15 J. BANKING REG., Jan. 2014, at
1–13 (empirically demonstrating that liquidity regulation encouraging banks to invest in more
short-term, low-risk securities and to fund assets by more long-term, stable sources of debt
imposes costs on banks that reduce their profits through lower net interest spread, but if bank
liquidity is sufficient to withstand subsequent periods of market stress, also will reduce public
expenditures associated with bank failure).
10.
11.
12.
13.
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withstand a thirty-day runoff of liabilities. The NSFR encouraged banks
to rely more fully on long-term, stable sources of funding. Given the
existence of a liquidity premium embedded within the yield curve, both
liquidity rules adversely impacted net interest income and profitability,
as short-term investment securities typically earn less and long-term debt
normally costs more. The Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”) has
established a repository for the now very large number of articles
demonstrating the impact of financial regulation. 16 Its work shows that
once a banking law is enacted or a regulation is released, the number of
academic and professional references proliferates.
Our investigation precedes such studies and assesses the cycles
of the enactment of law, promulgation of regulation, and release of
related supervisory measures. Legislators and the administration
invariably respond to economic contractions coupled with problems
experienced by financial institutions. Bank crises are not a new
phenomenon. A crisis can include a panic when the financial markets,
the inter-bank market, and depositors lose confidence in the banking
sector and withdraw funds, and a failure when many institutions are
liquidated or merged by regulatory authority. Crises occur in the U.S.
and other countries approximately every generation. U.S. banks have
recovered ten years after the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting
economic contraction.
It is instructive to briefly review the long and frequent episodes
of bank failure and market stress over the past century to provide a base
for later legislative and regulatory analysis. Bank failure is a key catalyst
prompting Congress and the then existing administration to enact law and
introduce new regulatory agencies and accompanying regulation. The
introduction of new agencies and programs subsequently broadens and
deepens the reasons, or raison d’etre, banks are supervised. Regulation
is self-reinforcing.
III. HISTORICAL BANK FAILURE AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
A former Comptroller of the Currency responsible for regulation
and supervision of national banks indicated, “[t]he [bank] failures for the
current year have been numerous, many having been characterized by
16. Frederic Boissay et al., Impact of Financial Regulations: Insights from an Online
Q.
REV.,
Mar.
2019,
at
53–68,
Repository
of
Studies,
BIS
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1903f.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE33-UK7A].
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gross mismanagement and some by criminality of an aggravated
character. . ..” 17 Although these words easily could have been written in
the United States during any crisis, including the most recent financial
crisis in 2008, they were penned in 1891 by then Comptroller Edward S.
Lacey. 18 The following chronicle notes how banking laws have
responded to financial and banking crises over the past century and
introduced new agencies responsible for carrying out the mandate. The
legislative responses have increased, broadened, and deepened the
reasons banks are supervised.
After winning the presidential election in 1912, Woodrow Wilson
prioritized banking reform in response to the devastating banking crisis
and severe recession of 1907. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 19 created
the existing central bank. Additional access to liquidity did not quell
future panics, but provided further justification for the supervision of
banks. 20
The Banking Act of 1933 21 established the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and authorized the new agency to
provide limited federal deposit insurance as of 1934 following numerous
bank failures and bank runs resulting from the Great Depression, the Dust
Bowl, and the subsequent National Banking Holiday when deposit
institutions were closed. 22 The modest governmental deposit coverage
did not stem subsequent losses from failure, but again expanded the
rationale for why banks are regulated.
The Federal Reserve shocked the markets in 1979 by dramatically
increasing short-term interest rates to control rampant inflation. Savings
and loan (“S&L”) institutions suffered severe disintermediation as
customers withdrew funds in favor of Treasury securities offering higher
yields than financial institutions were then able to pay on deposit
products. Congress passed several laws, including the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 23 and the

17. JOHN JAY KNOX, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES 194 (Bradford
Rhodes & Co. et al. eds., 1900).
18. See id.
19. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
20. Id.
21. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
22. Id.
23. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
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Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 24 to alleviate the
industry’s liquidity and interest rate risk difficulties. The thrift industry
was unable to make or purchase a sufficient volume of performing loans
then newly authorized. One third of the industry failed between 1986 and
1995.
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 25 created the Resolution Trust Corporation to liquidate and
manage insolvent S&Ls, imposed new restrictions, abolished the
supervisory authority of the Federal Home Loan Banks, and created a
new, and short-lived, agency, called the Office of Thrift Supervision, to
oversee the rapidly shrinking S&L industry. 26 In response to market
turmoil, commercial banks aggressively entered the residential mortgage
loan market vacated by thrifts, thereby setting the stage for the next
financial catastrophe.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”) 27 eliminated
restrictions on affiliations between commercial banks and investment
banks, and between insurance firms and banks. The absence of economic
stress or systemic bank failure invariably prompts the industry to lobby
for easing prior restrictions.
Congress and the administration responded to the 2008 financial
crisis with policy initiatives comparable to those which followed U.S.
banking crises over the past century: (1) conduct hearings; (2) enact new
restrictive laws that attempt to prevent similar abuses in the future; and
(3) create new regulatory agencies or increase authority for existing
agencies to promulgate rules and monitor institutional compliance with
the law. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) 28 created the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and the Federal Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC) among other entities, and expanded the powers of the Federal
Reserve, the FDIC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”), as well as required banks—especially those deemed
systemically-important, or Too Big to Fail—to increase funding by equity
24. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (1982).
25. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
26. See id.
27. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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capital, direct more attention to maintaining adequate levels of liquidity,
and enhance risk management processes.
Congress revised the Dodd-Frank Act in 2018 with passage of the
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act
(“EGA”), 29 which required banking regulators to tailor their prudential
regulations issued in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis to account
for differences in risk and complexity among regulated banks.
The United States has a long and undistinguished historical
record of bank failure, market panic, and legislative response. Wellconceived public policy initiatives often result in unintended
consequences leading to subsequent bank failures, which serve as a
catalyst for new legislative and regulatory efforts.
IV. BANK FAILURE AND ECONOMIC DISTRESS
Researchers long ago noted that bank failures coincide with
adverse developments in the economy. Freidman and Schwartz
contend problems in the financial system worsen an economic
contraction by reducing the wealth of bank shareholders and
precipitating a rapid decline in the supply of money. 30 Former Federal
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke extends their pioneering work by
evaluating how debtor bankruptcies may further affect economic
output and indicating that “[a]s the real costs of intermediation
increase, some borrowers (especially households, farmers, and small
firms) f[ind] credit to be expensive and difficult to obtain. The effects
of this credit squeeze on aggregate demand helped convert the severe
downturn of 1929–1930 into a protracted depression.” 31 Charles
Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, among other academics, claim that
bank failures are part of the business cycle and result from myopic
foresight by bankers. 32
Liquidity issues tend to follow once a bank’s capital, asset
quality, and earnings problems become well-known by regulatory
29. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGA”), Pub.
L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).
30. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1960 passim (1963) (arguing that changes in the
money supply profoundly influenced the U.S. economy).
31. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of
the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 257 (1983).
32. CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 2–4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 5th ed. 2005).
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supervisors, credit rating agencies, and the inter-bank market. The
press publishes adverse articles about the financial problems of a bank
or the banking system. Core and non-core depositors alike withdraw
funds. If a rapidly deteriorating bank has little high-quality collateral
available for pledging at the central bank or correspondent banks,
liquidity pressures deepen. Weak banks lacking unencumbered,
quality assets are unable to borrow funds in the inter-bank market
even on a short-term basis. Diamond and Dybvig believe the mission
of the banking industry is conducive to precipitating banking panics
since “[b]anks create liquidity risk for themselves as they provide
liquidity to customers in the form of loan commitments and
mismatched terms of longer-term assets funded by shorter term
liabilities.” 33
Ultimately, a bank fails when management and the board of
directors are unable to establish a viable business plan for qualified
management to implement, and unwilling or incapable of identifying,
measuring, monitoring, and controlling risks commensurate with a
safe and sound institution. Parsons cites the results of almost 100
FDIC Material Loss Reviews that highlight issues leading to
governmental losses incurred when banks are liquidated or merged.
“Ineffective bank directors are identified as a primary cause of bank
failure.” 34 According to the FDIC, typical characteristics of the 489
banks that failed between 2008 and 2013 included “heightened
concentrations of [real estate acquisition, development, and
construction (“ADC”)] lending, rapid asset growth, reliance on
funding sources other than stable core deposits, and relatively lower
capital-to-assets ratios.” 35 The failing banks did not modify plans or
heed warning signs indicative of imminent economic distress, and
thus, the losses were predictable.

33. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POLITICAL ECON. 401, 401–419 (1983).
34. Richard J. Parsons, Banks Should Reject More Board Candidates, AM. BANKER (Oct.
19, 2012, 1:44 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/banks-should-reject-moreboard-candidates [https://perma.cc/7F6E-F2UU].
35. MARTIN J. GRUENBERG, CHAIRMAN, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CRISIS AND RESPONSE:
AN
FDIC
HISTORY,
2008–2013,
at
xxv
(2017),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/crisis-complete.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5KH3S4UN].
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V. RECENT BANK LEGISLATION
The earlier studies cited evaluated economic and financial
issues applicable to bank failure more than fifty years ago. Bank
failure is related to economic contraction. We updated these studies
and also found economic growth or contraction, the condition of the
financial markets, and bank failure as indicators of new banking
legislation. Table 1 provides statistics on the annual number of bank
failures in the United States over a half-century between 1968 and
2018. On average, fifty-nine banks failed per year and annual bank
failures ranged from zero during several years sampled to over 500 in
the tumultuous year of 1989. The two big waves of failure included
the thrift crisis during the 1980s and early 1990s, and that associated
with the housing finance debacle during the 2008 financial crisis. Our
focus is on promulgation of banking law and related regulation, rather
than extensive econometric analysis of bank failure and the economy.
We present four comprehensive economic and financial
market indices.
As shown in Table 1, the annual civilian
unemployment rate over the five decades sampled averaged 6.15%,
and ranged between 10.8% in 1982 and 3.4% in 1968. Real or
inflation-adjusted gross domestic product (“GDP”) expanded at an
average annual rate of 2.81%, and ranged between 7.2% in 1984 and
-2.5% in 2009. Ten-year U.S. Treasury notes averaged 6.34% per
year, and ranged between 14.59% in 1982 and 1.88% in 2015. By
contrast, real or inflation-adjusted ten-year U.S. Treasury rates
averaged 2.30%, and ranged between 10.79% in 1982 and -5.31% in
1974. The five decades depicted show high economic and market
variability important to understanding the potential relationship to
bank failure and resultant legislative action.
Table 1
Illustrative Economic and Market Indices and Bank Failure
(1968 to 2018)
Factor
Average
High
Low
U.S. Bank
Failure

59

531

0
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Unemployment
Rate

6.15%

10.80%

3.40%

% Change Real
GDP

2.81%

7.20%

-2.50%

10-year
Treasury

6.34%

14.59%

1.88%

Real 10-year
Treasury

2.30%

10.79%

-5.31%
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Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bureau of
Economic Analysis (Department of Commerce), Department of Labor
and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
We hypothesize that bank failures should increase during and
after periods of high unemployment, low or contracting GDP, and
high interest rates expressed on either a nominal or real basis. We
employ statistical correlation analysis to study the influence between
the economy, financial markets, and bank failure. Correlation
analysis provides a measure of the relative—not absolute—
relationship between variables and does not suggest causality or
economic consequence. Table 2 illustrates the coincident bank failure
correlation data that can range from +1.00 (i.e., perfect positive
correlation) to –1.00 (i.e., perfect inverse correlation).
As shown, bank failure correlates positively with the
unemployment rate at the 10% confidence level, and nominal and real
interest rates at the 5% confidence level with a one-tail or directional
(i.e., positive or negative) test. The confidence level represents the
probability that a relationship exists when otherwise untrue. As more
Americans seeking employment are unable to find meaningful fulltime work, they lack the financial ability, cash flow, and liquidity to
repay mortgage, credit card, and consumer loan debt. Bank loan
originations decline, loan losses increase, profits decay, capital
evaporates, and failures surge. Similarly, when nominal or real
interest rates increase, consumers and businesses alike find it more
expensive to repay loans—and bank failures rise. Although GDP
correlates with bank failures in a negative manner as projected (i.e.,
quicker economic growth should lead to fewer bank failures), the
result is not statistically significant.
The above statistical

104

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

relationships remain when failures are lagged by one year. Other
political factors, such as the election of a new President, the party
affiliation of the President, and whether the political composition of
Congress is unified or divided, proved insignificant to the passage of
banking laws and therefore are not illustrated in Table 2.
Table 2
Correlation of Bank Failure, Legislation and Economic &
Financial Indices (1968-2018)
Factor
Bank Failure
Bank Law
U.S. Bank Failure

N/A

33.3%*

Unemployment Rate

20.0%***

18.2%***

% Change Real GDP

-4.4%

-27.0%**

10-year Treasury

25.2%**

1.8%

Real 10-year Treasury

28.9%**

9.7%

Statistical Significance: * at 1%, ** at 5%, and *** at 10%
There have been approximately twenty major pieces of
banking legislation enacted in the United States (as listed in the
Appendix) during the last half-century. The passage of new
legislation coincides very strongly with the condition of the banking
industry and the economy. The correlation between those years in
which a new banking law was passed (shown as a dummy variable,
one, and otherwise, zero) and bank failure is positive, and significant
at the 1% level, as shown in Table 2. Congress responds to periods
of increasing bank failure and related escalating liquidation costs
borne by the public by introducing new programs, rules, and agencies
to reduce the potential repetition of failure in the future. Although
economic expansion and contraction within GDP showed no
significance explaining bank failure, the relationship is negative and
significant at the 5% level when correlated with the passage of a new
bank law. Similarly, the unemployment rate correlates positively with
the enactment of new law and is significant at the 10% confidence
level.
Repeated legislative efforts to respond to prior crises by
introducing a central bank and lender of last resort, providing modest
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deposit insurance coverage, and requiring more stringent regulatory
rules applicable to capital, liquidity, and risk management have not
been sufficient despite expectations to the contrary. Bankers and
regulators appear reluctant to acknowledge the expensive lessons
from prior episodes of failure. As cited above, such failure has been
attributed to the unwillingness or inability of management and the
board to measure, monitor, and control risks compatible with a viable,
safe, and sound institution, or implement business plans that promote
long-term survival.
Recent regulatory and governance efforts to promote board
diversity and require refreshment strategies have produced mixed
results. For example, Baum notes that “[t]he empirical support for
staffing boards with independent directors, however, remains
surprisingly shaky given the ubiquitous reliance on independent
directors. The [2008] financial crisis has added further doubts.” 36
Similar evidence contradicts “good” governance claims applicable to
board diversification. 37 Pathan and Faff conducted a longitudinal study
of large U.S. bank holding companies prior to and after the rules of
Sarbanes-Oxley were introduced and focused on the composition of
boards. 38 They found that “[a]lthough gender diversity improves bank
performance in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period (1997–2002),
the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX (2003–
2006) and the crisis periods (2007–2011).” 39 Further, Essen et al. found
that prior governance recommendations have not allowed banks to
prosper or avoid failure during crises. “Good governance
prescriptions, such as board independence, incentive compensation
and the separation of the CEO and board chair, have on the whole
proved harmful to firm performance in times of crisis.” 40 The
research mentioned above indicates that efforts to enhance

36. Harald Baum, The Rise of the Independent Director: A Historical and Comparative
Perspective
1–34
(Jul.
30,
2016)
(unpublished
paper),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814978&download=yes
[https://perma.cc/9AB4-LHES].
37. See id.
38. Shams Pathan & Robert Faff, Does Board Structure in Banks Really Affect Their
Performance?, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 1573, 1573–89 (2013).
39. Id. at 1573.
40. Marc van Essen, Peter-Jan Engelen & Michael Carney, Does “Good” Corporate
Governance Help in a Crisis? The Impact of Country- and Firm-Level Governance
Mechanisms in the European Financial Crisis, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE 201, 201 (2012).
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governance have not provided an additional safeguard to augment law
and regulation.
Congress responds to periods of economic distress, related surges
in bank failure, and ballooning fiscal costs to bailout the financial sector
by introducing legislative safeguards. New regulatory agencies are
created that precipitate additional reasons financial institutions are
supervised. Existing or newly-created banking agencies promulgate
regulation among other sources of guidance for the financial sector.
VI. RECENT BANK REGULATION
While banking law is critical to the development of plans and
policies by insured financial institutions, accompanying regulation is
more influential. In most circumstances, federal legislation is not selfeffectuating.
Market participants wait until the issuance of
accompanying regulations, which outline the true extent of compliance
obligations before conforming their business operations to the new legal
requirements. In many cases, these regulations are not issued until well
after the statute’s effective date. This leaves business and market
operations to continue largely unchanged until the regulations are issued
and fully effective. It is the issuance of the accompanying regulations,
rather than passage of the legislation, that has a substantial impact on
financial operations of banks.
In the case of the Dodd-Frank Act, which substantially
overhauled regulation of prudential financial regulation, consumer
financial protection, and the derivatives and mortgage markets—among
other changes—the total number of separate rulemaking requirements
was 390. 41 These regulations were not issued for many years after
passage of the Act, and in some cases, the regulations are still not yet in
full effect. For example, as of July 19, 2016, only 274 of 390 total
rulemaking requirements (or 70%) had been finalized—six years after the
Act’s enactment. 42 This regulatory overhang happens frequently and
results in the impact from new banking laws being felt many years after
their enactment.

41. See Dodd-Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP (July 19, 2016),
www.davispolk.com/dodd-frank-rulemaking-progress-report [https://perma.cc/ZX78-9757].
42. Id.
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Many U.S. Presidents have issued executive orders to ensure
regulatory benefits exceed costs. 43 President Carter (Executive Order
12044) required procedures for analyzing the impact of new regulations
and attempted to minimize their adverse impact in 1980. 44 During the
same year, Congress passed, and President Carter signed, a law that
created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) to
review and approve all new reporting requirements. 45 President Reagan
(Executive Order 12291) provided OIRA with further responsibility to
ensure regulatory benefits exceed costs in 1982. 46 By enacting Executive
Order 12866 President Clinton retained OIRA’s review of new regulatory
burdens and reinforced the viewpoint that regulation should maximize
net benefits to society. 47 Most recently, President Trump issued
Executive Orders 13891 and 13892 to improve agency guidance and
enforcement. 48
These executive orders are not applicable to independent
agencies, such as the federal banking regulators, but set important
precedent that may be followed by independent agencies in certain cases.
For example, independent agencies may choose to voluntarily adopt the
precepts that agency guidance should not form the basis for determining
violations of law, and that significant guidance should be issued through
public notice and comment with approval from high-ranking agency
officials. The executive orders are also consistent with recent
Interagency Statement. 49 Nevertheless, the volume of regulation and
regulatory guidance has continued to be issued at a rapid pace,
significantly impacting operations of financial institutions as many
researchers have analyzed.
We evaluate the trend in the number and type of regulatory
pronouncements in the United States over the past twenty-five years. We
43. Susan Dudley, A Brief History of Regulation and Deregulation, REG. REV. (Mar. 11,
2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/03/11/dudley-brief-history-regulationderegulation/ [https://perma.cc/RXF9-TFL6].
44. See Exec. Order No. 12044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12661 (Mar. 23, 1978).
45. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980); accord
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified as
amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2018)).
46. See Exec. Order No. 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
47. See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
48. See Exec. Order No. 13891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55235 (Oct. 9, 2019); Exec. Order No.
13892, 84 Fed. Reg. 55239 (Oct. 9, 2019).
49. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 18-5/ CA 18-7, INTERAGENCY
STATEMENT CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE (Sept. 12, 2018).
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focus on law and regulation of the banking sector rather than thrift
institutions. The majority of regulations released in the 1980s and early
1990s emphasized the problems and failure of the savings and loan
industry leading to the creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation, and
the merger of the beleaguered and woefully inadequate Savings
Association Insurance Fund with the Bank Insurance Fund. Savings and
loans are no longer an important component of the banking industry.
According to the FDIC, banks account for 87.3% of the 5256 financial
institutions and 93.7% of the $18.5 trillion of assets as of September 30,
2019. 50 Thrift industry analysis represents a historical perspective while
the banking sector is forward-looking. In addition, the FDIC began
electronic publication of regulations in 1995. 51 Accordingly, we review
the trend and type of regulation over twenty-five years between 1995 and
2018. Many regulatory releases of the FDIC (insured banks and statechartered, non-member banks) are also simultaneously promulgated by
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (national- or federalchartered banks), and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (state-chartered member banks and holding companies).
The FDIC released over 350 regulations during the quartercentury period studied, averaging 14.75 regulations per year. As shown
in Table 3, the numbers of regulatory pronouncements ranged between
thirty in 2009, to five in 2003. The correlation with economic conditions,
bank failure, and political affiliation of the President and Congress is
presented in Table 4. The correlation between the passage of time (1995
is one and 2018 is twenty-four) and regulation is negative, and not
significant. Similarly, there is a modest—but insignificant—positive
correlation between the enactment of new banking law and the release of
regulation. The insignificance is unsurprising given the time taken by
agencies to respond to a new law and craft guidance for the industry.
However, the number of new regulations does correlate positively with
the number of annual bank failures; the correlation is significant at the
10% confidence level.
50. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Quarterly Banking Profile: Third Quarter 2019, 13 FDIC
QUARTERLY
1,
5–11,
tbls.I-A,
II-A,
III-A,
IV-A
&
V-A
(2019),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2019-vol13-1/fdic-v13n1-4q2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HS9G-53RW].
51. See, e.g., Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, https://www.ecfr.gov/cgibin/ECFR?page=browse [https://perma.cc/8NY9-VSRF] (last visited Dec. 20, 2019)
(providing electronic access to FDIC, and other agencies) regulations); Federal Register: The
Daily Journal of the United States Government, https://www.federalregister.gov
[https://perma.cc/TY4M-HHGF] (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
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Table 3
Regulation by FDIC (1995 to 2018)
Factor
Average
High

Low

Regulation

14.75

30

5

Safety &
Soundness

4.13

16

0

Administrative

6.04

18

1

Compliance

4.58

13

1

Source:
Electronic
https://gov.ecfr.io.

Code

of

Federal
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Regulations,

Regulatory supervisors invariably face more hostile legislators in
committee hearings as the public loses confidence in the banking sector
and costs to bailout failed institutions escalate. Regulatory guidance is
positively correlated with a Democratic-controlled Congress and a
President from the same party. As subsequently established, safety and
soundness rules respond to deteriorating conditions within the economy,
an increasing number of bank failures and political affiliation of the
president and Congress. Compliance regulatory guidance correlates with
the passage of bank law and with inflation and nominal interest rates.
Select prior laws require adjustment of stated thresholds with changes in
price. Administrative guidance retains no obvious relationship to
economic, industry or political factors.
Table 4
Correlation between Regulation, the Economy and Political
Factors (1995 to 2018)
Factor

Regulation

Safety &
Soundness

Administrative

Compliance

Time

-11.1%

21.7%

-7.5%

-43.0%

New Bank Law

13.6%

-4.9%

5.6%

28.9%***

Bank Failure

28.8%***

58.1%*

-13.1%

4.9%

Unemployment
Rate

31.8%***

58.9%*

-5.4%

0.5%
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% Change Real
GDP

-35.5%**

-54.3%*

-15.2%

12.5%

Inflation

5.5%

-24.5%

1.2%

42.4%**

10-year Treasury

7.3%

-24.9%

5.5%

41.2%**

Real 10-year
Treasury

4.3%

-11.0%

5.1%

17.1%

New President

9.2%

15.1%

-10.1%

13.8%

Democratic
President

34.2%**

39.9%**

20.5%

-3.3%

Democratic
Congress

50.2%*

64.9%*

16.1%

4.9%

Statistical Significance: * at 1%, ** at 5% and *** at 10%
We categorize regulation into three types: (1) safety and
soundness; (2) administrative; and (3) compliance. The categorization of
rules into one of these three groups must be viewed as approximate; other
legal scholars or banking experts could reasonably change the placement
of several regulations.
A.

Safety and Soundness

Approximately 28% of the regulatory releases reflect safety and
soundness and the number of safety and soundness regulations ranged
from zero for several years to sixteen in 2009 as the housing market
crashed and bank failures surged. While the number of such
pronouncements has increased with time as reflected by a positive
correlation, the relationship is not statistically significant.
By contrast, the release of new regulations designed to enhance
bank safety correlates very positively with the number of bank failures in
a given year, which is significant at the 1% level. And, regulatory rules
correlate highly with the economy. New guidance related to operating
safely correlates positively with the unemployment rate and negatively
with real GDP. Both economic metrics are significant at the 1% level.
Bankers can expect more regulatory guidance affecting the balance sheet
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and the income statement when the unemployment rate increases and the
economy contracts.
Political factors likewise affect the release of new guidance.
While safety and soundness rules increase just after the election of a new
President, given a positive correlation, the relationship is not sufficient to
be considered significant. The party affiliation of the President and
Congress are important to operating safely. However, it is not obvious
that a Democratic or Republican President or Congress should be more
or less likely to champion new banking regulation. Given the absence of
an a priori relationship, we apply a two-tail or non-directional statistical
test. The correlation between the release of new regulations and a
President from the Democratic party is positive and significant at the 5%
level and very positive with a Democratic-controlled Congress
significant at the 1% level. Party affiliation is important and elections
must be monitored closely by bankers to assess likely future asset/liability
directions. It is important to note that the correlation between political
party and issuance of safety rules applies only to a sample period of the
recent quarter-century. Such past relationships may change in the future.
B.

Administrative

Approximately 41% of the regulations promulgated by the FDIC
over the twenty-five-year period examined focus on administrative rules.
Administrative rules show no significance to economic or political
factors. The lack of correlation should not be interpreted to suggest such
rules are not costly to implement and can impact efficiency ratios
important to management and investors.
C.

Compliance

The remaining compliance category accounts for 31% of new
regulatory pronouncements by the FDIC. Passage of a new banking law
correlates positively with promulgation of new compliance directives,
which is significant at the 10% level. Similar to administrative
regulation, there is no discernable trend of compliance rules related to
political factors or bank failure. Compliance rules do correlate positively
with inflation (and interest rates that partially reflect projected inflation)
given historically enacted laws that require regulators to adjust thresholds
with changes in prices. Inflation and ten-year interest rates on U.S.
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Treasury notes are significant at the 5% level of confidence. In addition,
the correlation between time and compliance rules is negatively related,
not positive as projected, and thereby insignificant.
Bank failures prompt the promulgation of new banking
legislation and subsequent regulations, especially those reflecting safety
and soundness, structured to remediate the causes of liquidation and
related costs to maintain confidence in the financial system. Safety and
soundness guidance is especially sensitive to the economy given the
relationship to bank failures and the political affiliation of the President
and Congress.
Regulations ultimately respond to prior law enacted by Congress.
Some laws precipitate more guidance for the industry, or persist over a
long period of time with later modifications or revisions. Even though
the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted only ten years ago, it has prompted the
most supervisory attention and direction when compared to other pieces
of legislation during the twenty-five-year period examined. We
categorize the major issues and/or laws that precipitated the release of
banking regulation below:
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 52: 15.8%
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994 53 and Riegel-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994 54: 7.6%
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 55: 5.4%
Securities Act of 1933 56 and Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 57: 3.4%
Basel Compliance: 3.4%
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: 2.8%
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 58: 2.3%

52. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2018).
53. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 103325, 108 Stat. 2160 (2018).
54. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 103-328,
108 Stat. 2338 (2018).
55. Community Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (2018).
56. Securities Act, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (2018).
57. Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (2018).
58. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (2018).
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Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer
Protection Act 59: 2.3%
Accounting: 0.9%

Not all regulations have the same financial impact on the
industry. Other research previously cited attempts to recognize the costs
of complying with regulation. Our effort is more modest and has assessed
why and when banking laws are enacted and subsequent regulations are
disseminated.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article reviews key banking laws enacted in the United
States during the past half-century with a focus on resulting regulatory
trends over the previous twenty-five years. We have addressed a number
of related questions. How has banking legislation, supervision and
regulation evolved, and what external factors, if any, precipitate change?
Bankers can anticipate they will need to respond to more banking-related
laws as the economy contracts and bank failures surge. Once enacted,
existing or newly-created regulatory bodies will be more likely to issue
guidance.
Do evolving regulations primarily reflect safety and soundness,
compliance, or administrative matters? Administrative rules are more
common than compliance or safety and soundness rules, but exhibit little
association with the economy, the financial sector, or political factors.
Compliance regulatory guidance increases during periods of rapidly
rising prices and enactment of new law. Regulators are more likely to
release new safety and soundness guidance under an adverse economy
and deteriorating banking sector. Regulators also disseminate more
safety and soundness rules under a Democratic President or Congress.
There is no evidence regulatory activity has increased over the past
quarter century evaluated. However, we have conclusively determined
that economic, market, and political trends cannot be ignored when
analyzing the enactment of bank-related laws and notice of resulting
regulation.

59. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGA”), Pub.
L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).
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APPENDIX: KEY BANKING LAWS (1968 TO 2018)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

International Banking Act of 1978
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Risk Control Act of 1978
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980
Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989
Crime Control Act of 1990
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act of 1994
Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1996
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
International Money Laundering Abatement and
Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005
Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006
The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010

